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NEW PROCEDURE FOR OLD
JOHN F. X. FINNt
"Obviously, in our legal system there are greater forces and processes than
rules of law and tribunals, judicial or administrative-the system sheds the
outworn and incorporates the tried and useful, all to its continued efficacy and
usefulness as a cherished institution."--McFarland.1
In recent years the spotlight of legal thought has been focussed upon
procedural problems incident to the administration of justice in large
urban centers.' The more piercing the rays, the more vividly is revealed
the imminent upheaval of "the firmest pillar of good government" by a
formidable army of procedural ills spurred on by a triune Menace so
insidious that every Attack upon it to date has failed of Victory.
I
The Menace
In the front rank, on the civil side, are "The Three Musketeers of
the Law's Delay": the negligence action, the jury trial and the "settle-
able" case.' The fencing with these united foemen has at times been
t Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University, School of Law.
1. Administrative Agencies in Government and the Effect Thereon of Constitutional
Limitations, a prize winning essay (1934), 59 A. B. A. Rep. 326, 347.
The italics used throughout this paper have been inserted by the writer.
2. As early as 1921 Roscoe Pound wrote in The Spirit of the Common Law, at page 124,
"It requires no great study of our procedure to enable us to perceive that many of its
features, taking the country as a whole, were determined by the conditions of rural com-
munities of seventy-five or one hundred years ago. . . .The demand for organization of
justice and improvement of legal procedure comes from our cities .... To deal adequately
with the civil litigation of a city ...we must obviate waste of judicial power, save time
and conserve effort." Statistics tabulated at pages 36-40 of the First Report of the
Judicial Council of the State of New York (1935) indicate delays as of June 30, 1934 In
counties in or near New York, N. Y., of 38 months in the Supreme Court, 52 months In
the City Court and 3134 months in the Municipal Court as against no delays in the Su-
preme Court in 29 suburban or rural counties. See also the REPORT oF r E CoarmaxSsom
on =E ADorrlsRATon or JusncE n NE-W YORK STAT (1934) where it Is stated, at
page 13: "In some courts and in some counties the delay amounts to positive denial of
justice. When a claim matures for litigation, sufficient time must thereafter elapse to give
the defendant due notice, to give opportunity to settle the issues upon which to seek the
court's determination and to prepare and present the evidence, and to give' time for the
court to reach a decision. A delay due solely to congestion of the calendar of over six
months in tort cases and over two months in commercial cases has been said by the
Judicial Council of New Jersey to constitute a denial of justice. We concur in that state-
ment, lacking any better general standard."
3. It appears from the REPORT or Tm Commsssio oN TnF ADMnusmAoT4 oF
JusIC In NEw YORK STATE (1934), that (a) "Some 60 per cent to 75 per cent of the
cases now on the calendars of the Supreme Court consists o'f negligence cases, In
most of which a jury trial is demanded." (pp. 23-24); that (b) "more than one-third of all
law actions in the Supreme Court deal with motor vehicle injuries" (p. 951) ; and that (c)
228
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listless,4 but of late the thrusts have become more frequent and the blades
more keen.' The renewed zeal of both judges and lawyers under the
"something like 74 per cent of all cases started in the Supreme Court are never tried, but that
these 74 per cent, amounting to thousands of cases, remain on the calendars undisposed of
until they are actually called for trial, which may involve a period of waiting extending from
several months to several years" (p. 23). Note, with respect to the last group of "settle-
able" cases, that a mere "General Calendar Call" is not really effective. The great bulk
of such cases do not settle until they are "actually called for trial." Cf. the First and
Second Reports of the Special Calendar Committee appointed by the Appellate Division
of the N. Y. Supreme Court, First Dept. dated respectively, June 20, 1927, and June, 1928.
These reports recommended an increase of filing fees to cut down jury trials and the
institution of an "auxiliary judicial force" of emergency referees. They state that statis-
tics from 1910-1926 show "unprecedented" increase in the number of cases on trial calen-
dars, 'largely due to tort actions growing out of automobile accidents.'
4. See Finn, Review of 2 Clark's Cases on Pleading and Procedure (1933) 2 Bnooxr.Y
L. R v. 328, 330: "New York, hoist by its concentration of population, and plagued by
trial calendars two years or more behind, has clutched at every possible panacea to cure the
law's delay. It has extended waivers of jury trial by statute and decision. It has in-
creased the initial filing fee in a jury case from $2 to $37 and in an equity case from $2
to $25, so that the litigation of the 'Forgotten Man' is fast descending from obscurity to
oblivion. Its legislature has just been considering increased fees in the lower courts. It
has increased the number of its judges. It has experimented with summary judgment,
declaratory judgments and statutory preferences, only to weaken the effectiveness of each
one of such devices by judicial decision. [Sunmnary judgment: Aetna v. National, 230 App.
Div. 486, 245 N. Y. Supp. 365 (Ist Dep't 1930); Dairymen's League v. Egli, 228 App. Div.
164, 239 N. Y. Supp. 152 (4th Dep't 1930); though cf. Irving Trust Co. v. Leff, 253 N. Y.
359, 171 N. E. 569 (1930). Declaratory judgments: James v. Alderton, 256 N. Y. 298, 176
N. E. 401; Newburger v. Lubell, 257 N. Y. 213, 177 N. E. 424 (1931); Colson v. Pegram,
259 N. Y. 370, 182 N. E. 19 (1932). Statutory preferences: Goldin v. Malone Dairy Co.,
Inc., 209 App. Div. 341, 204 N. Y. Supp 401 (1st Dep't 1924); Morse v. Press Pub. Co., 71
App. Div. 351, 75 N. Y. Supp. 976 (1st Dep't 1902); Dooley v. Paget, 38 Misc. 44, 76 N.
Y. Supp. 906 (Sup. Ct. 1902); Riglander v. Star Co., 98 App. Div. 101, 90 N. Y. Supp.
772 (1st Dep't 1904), aff'd, 181 N. Y. 531 (1905).] It is trying conciliation and arbitration.
It has been introduced to the Sweedler experiment but fails to use it in its Supreme Court
practice although the Special Calendar Committee of the Appellate Division in the First
Department recommended a similar plan as early as 1927, over the signatures of Victor J.
Dowling, Henry W. Taft, William Nelson Cromwell, Francis B. Delehanty, Bernard S.
Deutsch, Jeremiah T. Mahoney, Joseph M. Proskauer, Peter Schinuck and Samuel Sea-
bury." On March 26, 1935 the Senate of the State of New York p'~ed the McNaboe bill
providing for the appointment of emergency referees by the Appellate Division of the First
and Second Departments whenever such Appellate Divisions determine that the courts are
congested and behind in their work. While a step in the right direction, such bill may find
objection because the referees must be compensated and the Judicial Council of the State
has written "Until other epedients now under consideration have been tried, a sub-
judiciary is undesirable in this state." First Report (1935) p. 47. The State As-embly
also voted in March, 1935 to permit women to serve on New York juries. The enactment
of this bill into law is problematical.
5. The extension of summary judgment procedure, so ably discussed by Justice Shientag
in the preceding article herein, has proved a most effective weapon. Two constitutional
amendments have also been approved by the Judicial Council and considered by the legis-
lature for submission to the people, viz, one limiting trial by jury in civil cases involving
$250 or less and the other providing for a five-sixths jury verdict in civil cases. See aho the
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urging of Judicial Councils and Law Revision Commissions is perhaps
evidence of a struggle to survive. In any event, it has become definitely
apparent that unless legal practitioners swiftly "do something about it,"
they will inevitably find themselves in full retreat before the three em-
battled swordsmen. More robust than ever, they now relentlessly ad-
vance from day to day commanding their brigaded regiments of "admin-
istrative tribunals," "commissions," "arbitration boards" and similar
quasi-courts.6 At least one far-sighted statesman has already sounded
the alarm to warn of an
"List of 13 Recommendations" printed at page 10 of the First Report of the Judicial Coun-
cil (1935) and the "List of Subjects under Consideration" printed at page 11 thereof. Cf. in
addition pp. 41-49 of said Report and pp. 10-11 of the Report of the State Law Revision
Commission. The New York Supreme Court recently adopted a rule preferring most con.
tract actions over tort actions on thirty days notice. Rule IV, Appellate Division, First De-
partment, in effect Feb. 15, 1935. It has also ruled that service of amended pleadings no
longer "breaks the issue" so as to require a new note of issue and loss of calendar position.
Rule 150, as revised, effective March, 1935. The time in which to move to dismiss for failure
to prosecute has likewise been shortened. Rule 156, as revised, effective March, 1935. Numer-
ous "strike" actions have been abolished by statute, so that calendars will no longer be aug-
mented by actions for alienation of affections, civil seduction, criminal conversation, breach
of promise to marry. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT. §§ 61 a)-61 i) inclusive, effective March 29,
1935, printed in the New York Law Journal of April 1, 1935, page 1642. In personal injury
actions, commencing September 1, 1935, the testimony of hospital physicians and nurses
as to damage is to be taken before a referee subject to the court's discretion. CIV. PRAO.
Acr, § 354, as amended.
6. McFarland, Administrative Agencies in Government (1934), 59 A. B. A. Rep. 326,
346: "As these agencies attain these characteristics in marked degree and when their work
seems established as permanent tasks of government, they may be made courts in effect and
in fact." Pound, Justice According to Law (1914) 14 CoL. L. REV. 1, 26: "It is no
accident that France, which was the first country to develop modern administra-
tion, is more and more turning its administrative tribunals into ordinary courts." Finch,
Progress in Procedure (1934) 4 BROOKLYN L. Ra'. 1: "Progressive procedural changes must
be more fundamental in the future-or the work of the lawyers will tend more and more
to be transferred to administrative boards.... The Workmen's Compensation Commission in
the State of New York and other states is one striking example. There is strong agitation
now to follow with like manner in negligence litigation. Business men are endeavoring to
set up arbitration courts to settle disputes through trade associations. In new fields like
radio a department head is in control of the entire industry without any precedents or rules
for guidance." See also the following: Report by the Committee to Study Compensation
for Automobile Accidents; Report of Mass. Jud. Council (1932) 22; FRENCU, Tim AuTo-
aroBan COMPENSATION PLAN (1933); Clark and Shulman, Jury Trial in Civil Cases (1934)
43 YALE L. J. 867, 885; Message of Gov. Smith to the New York Legislature, dated Jan.
9, 1928, Legis. Doc. No. 53 (1928); Report of Special Calendar Committee of Appellate
Division, First Dept. (N. Y.), dated June 20, 1927, p. 11. Dowling, The Automobile Com-
pensation Plan, a summary, pp. 949-957 of Report of N. Y. Commission on the administra-
tion of Justice (1934); Lowe, How to Keep Litigation in the Courts (1934), 18 J. Am.
JuD. Soc. 90-91. The law business is slipping away from the lawyers and into the hands
of boards and commissions which are not hog-tied and fettered by rules of procedure and
practice. " . ..Delay is caused more by a Bourbon-like adherence to needless forms, cere-
monies and archaic methods than any other thing. The litigant wants action. The busi-
ness man wants a prompt decision. The state wants a prompt and speedy settlement of
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"apparent tendency, arising from necessity, to get most of our important prob-
lems settled outside the law as a matter of expediency. I am very doubtful
whether in the long run that is a desirable situation for a democracy.'4
What, then, "to do about it?" Certainly, "institutions geared to the
stage coach can hardly be suited to modern needs";" and practice and
procedure of necessity must be "geared in high" to meet emergencies of
calendar congestion, whether they be chronic or suddenly recurring. Of
course, "Emergency does not increase granted powers or remove or
diminish the restrictions imposed upon power granted or reserved." D
Yet emergencies do present the occasion for the exercise of new powers
by the "granting authority,"--the people-whose "reserved power" is
Reserve Power writ large. The gauge of battle has been flung and the
bench and bar must "call up the reserve" to meet the challenge. How-
ever harsh Tradition's touch, Right's rapier must maim the mace of
Might.
Two constitutional amendments have already been approved by the
New York Judicial Council and considered by the New York Legislature
for submission to the people. Both of them attempt to fell the strong-
est of "The Three Mlusketeers,"--the jury trial in civil cases. The five-
sixths verdict will undoubtedly be approved. The limitation of jury
trials in $250 cases may run afoul of demagoguery and the age-old cry
of "One law for the rich and another for the poor." Why not a third
Constitutional amendment, not so drastic, aimed at all jury trials, sub-
ject to the discretion of the court and "for emergencies only," when
emergencies are certified as such to the Governor by the Appellate Divi-
sions of the respective departments?
Well, possibly. But how far do you want to go? The answer is
something akin to a thought recently expressed by Presiding Justice
disputes.... We have heard much of late, of the proposed innovation of placing the 'rule-
making power' back in the courts. Who ever took it away? What is needed is a set of
rules of procedure under which the courts can function, speedily and without delay as
required by the mandate of the constitution. Anything less than this is not carrying out
the expressed will of the people, and is a subversion of the judicial power delegated by the
people to the courts." A valuable symposium on the subject is found in Haines and
Dimock, EssAYs Ox = LAw AwD PRAcrir or GovEm.ENrrAL Amm =-w=1s.m (1935). It
is there stated, at page 320: "Special administrative courts should be a means of dealing
with administration more satisfactorily and of democratizing justice." A particularly
valuable essay in the collection, printed at pp. 269-286, is entitled The Inadequacies of the
Rude of Law.
7. Owen D. Young, as quoted by Judge Finch, supra note 6.
8. M iia, Tan CoxsTn'ruoxm Al Momur Taxns (1934), 59 Rep. of Amer. Bar
Ass'n 348, 352.
9. Chief justice Hughes, in the Minmesota Mortgage Moratorium Law case, Home
Bldg. and Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (1934).
1935]
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Martin of the New York Appellate Division,10 who is reported to have
stated that he felt we can do a whole lot with what we already have, if
we will only do it intelligently,1 earnestly and honestly. If you prefer
the language of a higher court, "All procedure is merely a methodical
means whereby the court reaches out to restore rights and remedy
wrongs. It must never become more important than the purpose which
it seeks to accomplish." 12
II
The Attack
It is the thesis of this article that crowded cities and states can
profitably base a new procedure on the best elements of the present
10. New York Law Journal, February 8, 1935. Justice Martin is now a member of the
judicial Council of his state. Presiding over the busiest appellate court in the world, with
supervision of the Supreme Court in what is procedurally the most congested area in the
world, upon his shoulders has fallen the task of rousing the bench and bar from their
lethargy. After personally observing him in action for many years, both New York lawyers
and laymen have unqualified confidence in the leadership he has assumed. Note in passing,
that at the general election to be held in 1936, the electors of New York will pass upon
the question posited by their Constitution, "Shall there be a convention to revise the Con-
stitution and amend the same?" N. Y. Const. Art. XIV, sec. 2.
11. Cf. Proskauer, A New Professional Psychology Essential for Law Reform (1928)
14 A. B. A. J. 121: "Workable law reform will not be accomplished merely by specific
change in statute and rule. It must rest largely on a fundamental change in the group
psychology of the legal profession toward its function." See also Fowler, A Psychological
Approach to Procedural Reform (1934), 43 YALE L. J. 1254, 1270: "A statute that em-
bodies the crux of the change in definite concise expressions of policy or method would
seem to be preferable to a detailed, complex pattern that may overwork the habit breaking
and forming apparatus and lose the meaning appeal by reason of its disseminated and
unconcerted attack. The details of administration of the reform may be left to the dis-
cretion of the trial judge .... Any abuse of discretion... may be checked up by the appellate
court .... legislatively, .... or by a rule making power in the judges or some judicial council."
Again, at page 1264: "When a legislature tears the printed pattern out of the statute books
and inserts another, the reform is only begun. The substitution ... is successful only if it re-
places the old one in the minds of those who use the patterns .... The initial problem is to ...
determine whether the resistance ... is apt to lie in inertia ... or in an actual repugnance
springing from an affirmative attitude or tradition.... The final phase of the problem Is a
determination of the rate of speed at which the mechanism can be manipulated to secure a
proper and lasting result .... By confining the use of the new system to a small field in its
initial stages, and gradually widening its scope to all actions at law, the full measure of
psychological effectiveness (is) achieved." This re-echoes HEPBURN, TuE DEVELOPMENT OF
CODE PLEADING (1877) 83 n. 12, where it is pointed out that if it is attempted to overturn
in a day a deep-rooted procedural system: "The prejudices of thousands of practitioners must
be disregarded and the habits of their daily lives reversed; the active opposition of many
able men recognized as profoundly learned in the law must be overborne; a community
accustomed, especially in such matters, to be led by their lawyers must be assured of safety
in turning aside to follow a few reformers." There is always danger that Inertia will cause
a reform, improperly presented, to be called, as was the N. Y. Code of Civil Procedure,
a "Brobdignagian conglomeration of heterogeneous rules of law and practice."
12. Crane, J. in Clark v. Kirby, 243 N. Y. 295, 153 N. E. 79 (1926).
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federal equity practice, the Virginia "Judgment on motion" and the
English "New Procedure of 1932."
(a) The Federal Equity Practice of Having Each Case Supervised
by One Judge for All Purposes-The Present Trend in that Direction in
the States.
A federal equity rule13 provides:
"In any suit in which a receiver is appointed, the Judge who appoints the
receiver shall retain supervision over the cause; imless otherwise required by law
or by rule of this Court, a!l matters therein shall be heard by him upon such
notice to the parties and to the creditors as he shall prescribe..."
And a federal calendar rule 4 provides:
"Immediately after twenty days have elapsed since joinder of issue in all
causes the Calendar Commissioner shall place each such cause or proceeding
upon the calendar."
The efficacy of the federal equity rules, of which the foregoing are
typical, has received the approbation of high authorityY; Under this
13. Rule IV of the Equity Rules of the U. S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York is taken as illustrative.
14. The illustration is Rule VIII of the Calendar Rules of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, "Placing Causes on Calendars."
15. Clark and Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure-The Background (1935), 44
YAr.E L. J. 387, 393: "New York is often pointed to as an example of the lack of succesa
of the code system. But it is not actually one, for the crowded conditions in New York
City, coupled with a multitude of different statutory enactments and diverse rulings of the
court, have led to the unfortunate procedural uncertainty which exists there but does not
exist throughout the state as a whole. The success of such widely divergent states as Cali-
fornia, Minnesota and Connecticut indicates the real effectiveness of the procedure .... If
ever there was efficacy in the division of law and equity certainly it is long gone .... The
sensible course is to abolish the remaining formal vestiges for a completely unified system
reflecting the best in English and American judicial procedure.... The Federal Equity Rules
of 1912, in themselves an embodiment of this best practice, furnish the substantial model
for the new Federal procedure of the future." Wickes, The New Rule Making Power of
the U. S. Supreme Court (1934) 13 TFxxs L. REV. 1: "The historic method of approach
to the problem of regulating practice and procedure in civil actions at law in the federal
courts has been to provide in general that the practice in each federal trial court sa
conform to the practice in the courts of the state in which that federal court is sitting,
as that practice existed at some fixed time.... The Conformity Act has not proven satis-
factory in operation .... As a result-a statute was finally enacted on June 19, 1934 (28
U. S. C. A. sec. 723 b. 723, c), giving the Supreme Court of the U. S. power to precribe
by general Rules the practice and procedure in civil actions at law for the district courts
of the U. S.... The need for a modem scientific system of federal procedure is acute. ...
The new statute is also an important step in the substitution of rules of court for statutes
in the regulation of judicial procedure." The Supreme Court now has the same power
to make rules for the regulation of procedure in a civil action at law that it possed with
respect to suits in equity as early as 1792 (1 Stat. 276); Sunderland, Grant of Rule-making
Power to the Supreme Court of the U. S. (1934) 32 MI=H. L. REv. 1116; Shelton, Progress
of the Proposal to Substitute Rules of Court for Common Law Practice. (1918) 5 VA. L.
RnV. 111; Jaureguy, Inmprovement of Rules of Judicial Procedure (1934) 14 ORn. L. REv.
20; Sunderland, The Grant of Rule Making Power to the Supreme Court of the U. S.
19351
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practice, if Judge Woolsey, let us say, has appointed a receiver of the
Ambassador Hotels, Judge Woolsey hears every motion or proceeding of
any kind that is ever brought relating to such Ambassador Hotels.
Everything apropos is automatically referred to him under the rule.
Similarly, in New York State, the Supreme Court of New York
County has a "Guaranteed Mortgage Certificate Justice" in the person
of Mr. Justice Frankenthaler, and a "Condemnation Justice" on oc-
casion is permitted to continue as such even while he continuis with his
work in other parts. The Supreme Court of Kings County has an "S.
W. Straus Reorganization Justice" in the person of Mr. Justice Lock-
wood, a "Matrimonial Justice" for matrimonial cases during a given
term, "when not otherwise engaged,""la' an "Incompetents' Estates Jus-
tice" for a given term, "when not otherwise engaged," and so on.
In Surrogate's practice every motion relating to a given estate is usually
referred to the Surrogate who initially dealt with such estate. Personal
judicial supervision of a case or of "types of cases" grows apace.
New York also has a provision for "omnibus motions" in Section 117
of its Civil Practice Act, which long ago fell into "innocuous desuetude"
but which, like the phoenix, is rising again under the influence of the
Judicial Council.1" The Judicial Council is also advancing with great
force a proposal for an "Administrative Justice" in each judicial dis-
trict.17 The State Legislature, under the leadership of Senator Buckley,
is heartily cooperating wherever possible.
(b) The Virginia "Judgment By Motion."
As pointed out by Mr. Justice Shientag, whatever New York's original
reactions were to Rule 113 of its Rules of Civil Practice, it is now
thoroughly accustomed to summary judgment on motion in many
cases.
17
a
.
(1934), 32 MicH. L. REv. 1116; Clark, Procedural Reform and the Supreme Court (1926)
8 AuamR. MEwcuRy 445; cf. Clark, The New Illinois Civil Practice Act (1933) 1. U. or Cit.
L. Rmv. 209; Anderson, Reform in Legal Systems 10 AmaER. POL. SCI. Rzv. 569; Forster,
Law Reform, 9 A-um. Por.. Scx. REV. 735; Crownover, Jr., Procedural Simplification (1934)
12 Tram. L. REv. 90; Hawley, Present Tendencies in Judicial Refoym 9 Aaxn. PoL. Sc.
REV. 529; Whittier, Controlling Court Procedure by Rules Rather than by Statutes 20 Am3m.
Por.. Scr. REv. 836.
15a. See Rule 15, Special Term, Kings County.
16. First Report of the Judicial Council (1935) 48. Cf. Senate Int. 2187 (1935). "It
is proposed ... to amend the Civil Practice Act to permit pre-trial appearance before a
judge to settle the issues and eliminate issues." Cf. Ragland, DiscovRY BUrOMn TMAr 227,
where he discusses "Judicial Control of Pre-Trial Practice."
17. First Report, op. cit. supra, at 43. See also an exhaustive brief on the con-
stitutionality of the plan, in view of art. VI, § 19 of the State Constitution, which pro-
vides " .. .the justices of the Supreme Court shall not hold any other public office or
trust, except that they shall be eligible to serve as members of the Constitutional Conven-
tion." REPORT or TH CoumMssIoN ON = AD M STRATIO OF JusCrc (1934) pp. 419-
494.
17a. Shientag, Summary Judgment (1935) 4 FOPWrAm L. REv. 186 at 223.
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In Virginia, there is in force a statutory remedy for judgment on
notice of motion in lieu of an action at law, which is available in any law
action.'8 The success of this device has been evidenced by its frequent
use and the approbation of the Virginia bar, so that a proposal has been
made to extend it to all equity proceedings as well..1 The procedure has
also been adopted in West Virginia.2 °
(c) The English "New Procedure of 1932."
Prior to 1932 England attempted to expedite the process of justice by
a system of "masters" or semi-official referees who supervised pre-trial
matters relating to the framing of the issues to be tried. (E.g., amend-
ment of pleadings, bills of particulars, discovery and so forth.)
This system was chiefly objectionable for two reasons, viz., first, be-
cause it was expensive to have a "sub-judiciary" to support; and second,
because "masters" or "referees," who were not actually judges, were so
remote from the trial that procedure before them readily lent itself to
mere formality and delay. The English people themselves severely
criticized their own device.2 '
In 1932 an innovation was instituted, known as the "New Procedure"
of that year'n and it has been functioning ever since. The purpose of
such "New Procedure" was to achieve a speedy trial (or to settle the
case), before the judge who first heard any matters in connection with
it. Such procedure applies to actions assigned to the King's Bench Di-
vision, but does not apply to actions for libel, slander, malicious prosecu-
18. VA. CODn (1930) § 6046, succeeding VA. CoDE (1916) § 6046 which was derived by
extension from 4 VA. STAT. (Hening) 352 and 1 VA. STAT. (Hening) 297, the statute last
stated being limited to actions against sheriffs because in 1644 "most of the sheriffs, as is con-
ceived, have converted a great part of the eighteen pound of tobacco per pole to their
private benefit.'
19. 2 Va. Jud. Council Rep., Appendix; Report of Committee on Legal Reform of
Pleading and Practice (1929) 36 W. VA. L. Q. 1, 67 et seq.
20. Cf. Mllar, "Three American Ventures in Summary Civil Procedure (1928) 38 YA.n
L. J. 193, 213-224.
21. Mullins, IN QuET or Jusncn (1932); Greenbaum and Reade, Tm Knx;'s BmxcH
MAsEms Am E--NGLIS IummcuToa P AcnicE (1932); Ragland, Discov=7 nron=z TnnLL;
McCormack, Lights and Shadows in English Justice (1932) 18 A. B. A. J. 603, cf. Rosen-
baum, Studies in English Procedure (1914), 63 U. or PA. L. R v. 105, 151, 273, 380, 505. 64,
id. 357, 472, 583, and Sunderland, The English Struggle for Procedural Reform (1926) 39
H Av. L. Rv. 725.
22. Order 30=V1I A, Statutory Rules and Orders (1932) No. 252 L. 7 Supreme Court
England; THE AN-NUAL PRACTiCE (The White Book) (1933) p. 711 If., p. 1751-1752; Az.znMAL
Snunvn or ENiisH LAW (1933) 307; The New Procedure Rules in Operation (1932) 174
L. T. 80, 101; Mfillar, The "New Procedure" of the English Rules (1932) 27 IM. L. REV.
363; cf. Bail, Practice and Procedure (1935) 51 L. Q. REv. 13, 21:
"There can be no doubt that the new procedure has had effect to expedite the trial of a
large number of actions. Of those which do find their way into this list rather more
than half appear to be actions for negligence. It often happens that on the return to a
procedure summons, Master or judge suggests a via nedia which leads to the amicable
settlement of the action."
1935]
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tion, false imprisonment, seduction, or breach of promise of marriage,
nor to actions in which fraud is alleged by the plaintiff.23 Any actions
to which the new order applies may be made a new procedure action at
the option of the plaintiff by marking the writ of summons with the words
"New Procedure," and, if the plaintiff's solicitor, where "satisfied that
the action is one to which this Order applies and that it is not by reason
of its complexity or other circumstances unsuitable for the procedure
prescribed by this Order," indorses on the writ of summons a certificate
that in his opinion the action is fit for the new procedure. Other rules
provide for a transfer to the new procedure list at the instance of the
defendant or by order of the judge.
The rules then provide for a speedy filing of plaintiff's statement of
claim, defendant's defense and counterclaim, and plaintiff's reply (at
intervals of not over seven days), and that the plaintiff shall take out
a summons for directions before one of the judges taking the new pro-
cedure list. On the hearing, the judge has extensive powers in his discre-
tion as to ordering further pleadings or discovery or inspection of docu-
ments or trial as a new procedure action or transfer to the ordinary list
or for trial at Assizes or for remission to a County Court or may
"(g) order the action or any issue therein to be tried with a jury or without
a jury as, in his discretion, he may think fit;
"(h) order that no more than a specified number of expert witnesses may be
called;
"(j) order that any particular fact or facts may be proved by affidavit or
that the affidavit of any witness may be read at the trial on such conditions as
the Judge may think reasonable or that any witness whose attendance in Court
ought for some sufficient ground to be dispensed with be examined before a
Commissioner or Examiner; provided that where it appears to the Judge that
the other party reasonably desires the production of a witness for cross-ex-
amination and that such witness can be produced, an order shall not be made
authorizing the evidence of such witness to be given by affidavit, but the ex-
penses of such witness at the trial may be specially reserved;
"(k) record any consent of the parties either wholly excluding their right of
appeal or limiting it to the Court of Appeal or limiting it to questions of law
only.
"(3) The Judge may order that any question involving expert knowledge
shall be referred to a special referee for enquiry and report, and in particular
and without prejudice to the general power, the Judge may refer to a special
referee for inquiry and report any question arising as to the nature, extent
and permanence of any injury caused or alleged to have been caused by the
negligence of a party on the terms (a) that the report when received shall be
communicated to both parties with a view to ascertaining whether they are
23. If fraud is alleged subsequently, the action may be transferred to the ordinary list,
and, if any party against whom fraud is alleged so desires, it shall be so transferred. The
new procedure does not apply to actions proceeding in any District Registry other than
the District Registries in Liverpool and Manchester.
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willing before further expense is incurred to agree to accept the report in whole
or in part; (b) that in so far as the report is not accepted by both parties it
shall be treated as information furnished to the Court, and shll, be subject to
the criticism of any expert witness called at the trial, and shall be given such
weight in deciding any question of difference between the expert witneses as
the Court shall think fit;...
"(4) In addition to the powers conferred by this Rule, the Judge shall have
all the powers which a Court or Judge has in respect of an action in the ordinary
list, and in exercising those powers he shall have special regard to the de-
sirability of saving time and expense and to the power of transferring actions
from the new procedure list to the ordinary list.
"(5) There shall be no appeal from a decision of the Judge under this Rule
without the leave of the Judge."
Rule 9 is as follows:
"(1) The Judge may fix a day for the trial of any new procedure action, and
the action shall, as far as possible, be tried on that day.
"(2) The action shall, as far as possible be tried by the Judge who heard
the summons for directions."
The latest report from England indicates that this "New Procedure"
has been thoroughly successful in operation.2
Its chief innovation is the abolition of civil jury trials. In em-
ergencies at least, it would seem that that is good policy,ss although the
24. Ball, Practice and Procedure (1935) 51 L. Q. Rav. 13.
25. Davies, The English New Procedure (1933) 42 YArn L. J. 337, 383: "In a Nev.
Procedure Action the question whether or not there shall be a jury is left entirely to the
discretion of the Judge. When an action involves difficult questions of fact, he will nat-
urally welcome the assistance of the 'twelve good men and true' but in a great number of
cases the questions are such that he will be fully able to answer them himself without any
such assistance. Thus Mlacnaughten, J., when taking the New List is reparted to have
stated that in street accident cases he was prepared to grant a jury where the amount of
damages had to be assessed but that it was better that the trial should be without a jury
where the issue was one of negligence only.... That (the New Rules) have shortened the
preliminary proceedings and simplified the trial is already apparent. The Lord Chief
Justice has given as an example of the expedition with which an action can be disposed
of under the New Procedure, the case of a man who came from East Africa in March, and
returned with the award in his pocket in October, although he only commenced pro-
ceedings in July.... The New Procedure cannot do everything but it is an important step
towards providing a more satisfactory method of obtaining legal redres." Ball, Practice
and Procedure (1935) 51 LAW QUar. Rv. 13, 21: "With regard to mode of trial, there
has been a radical change within the last few years. Until recently, there was a right to
trial by jury in all pure common law actions. Now however, the question 'jury or ro' is
in the discretion of the Court or judge, except in actions for libel, slander, malicious prosecu-
tion, false imprisonment, seduction or breach of promise of marriage and certain cases
involving fraud. The New Procedure is, of course, open to one criticism. It mahes a,
continual demand upon the services of two of His Majesty's Judges who sit to hear new
procedure applications and causes de die in diem during the term. This necessarily has
effect to delay the hearing of actions in the ordinary list; for the number of Judge3 aVailabl
to sit at nisi prius is by no means unlimited.' Cf. Shelton, The Drama of English Pro-
cedure (1931) 17 VA. L. Rrv. 215, where it is stated that a device for pretrial supervisi-on
of actions, "recommends itself strongly for large American cities where many courts are
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debate as to its advisability as a permanent measure still continues."
The most recent development in the discussion is Dean Clark's statistical
survey of jury trials in the Superior Court of New Haven County."7 It
is interesting to consider, in conjunction with that study, that in some
jurisdictions lawyers have fought to establish the principle that there is
a right to be tried before the court without a jury, even in criminal cases,
as is done in Maryland, California, Connecticut and Michigan. 8  New
necessary. It means much for reducing the time of jury service, which alone Is a featural
merit. It ought to be tried out beneficially in New York, Cleveland and Chicago." Any-
one who, while waiting for trial, has witnessed the picking of six or more juries simul-
taneously in the Central Jury Part of the New York Municipal Court has undoubtedly re-
flected that perhaps a non-jury trial during periods of calendar congestion might be more
desirable after all. Cf. note 30a, infra.
26. Clark and Shulman, Jury Trial in Civil Cases (1934) 43 YALa L. J. 867; McLemore,
An Argument against Jury Trial in Civil Cases, 20 VA. L. REv. 708; Corbin, The Jury on
Trial (1928) 14 A. B. A. J. 507; Sweet, The Jury on Trial: A Reply (1929) 15 A. B. A. 3.
241; Elder, Trial by Jury; Is It Passing? (1928) 156 HARPEms 570; Lummus Civil Juries
and the Laws Delay (1932) 17 MJAss. L. Q. 4; Wigmore, A Program for the Trial of Jury
Trial (1928) 12 id. 137; Wilkin, The Jury (1930) 13 3. AmL J n. SoC. 154; Green, Why
Trial by Jury? (1928) 15 Am. 1Vl cuY 316; Duane and Windolph (debate) Should the
Civil Jury Be Abolished? 80 FoRv.u 489, 498; Molique, Jury of Less Than Twelve Men
(1934) 10 NoTmR DA=a LAWYER 61. Harris, Is the Jury Vanishing? (1930) 4 CoNr. BAR
J. 73; Carpenter, The Jury Trial Will Pass off of Its Own Accord (letter) (1929) 15 A. B.
A. J. 581; McCook, N. Y. L. J. March 2, 1928 at p. 2643; Wherry, A Study (1931) 8 N. Y.
U. L. Q. REv. 396, 640.
27. Clark and Shulman (1934) 43 YA~m L. J. 867, 884: "Whatever the political,
psychological or jurisprudential value of the jury as an institution may be, its use in the
civil litigation covered by this study is certainly not impressive. The picture seems to be
that of an expensive, cumbersome and comparatively inefficient trial device employed in
cases where exploitation of the situation is made possible by underlying rules. Persuasive
reasons are found in the facts set forth for the definite limitation of the right of jury trial
to the role of safety valve; and for the greater use of the summary judgment in the debt
cases; the requirement of substantial jury trial fees and the reduction in the number of jurors
required for a petit jury to nine or even six."
28. Frank, "Trying Criminal Cases Without Juries in Maryland" (1931) 17 VA. L. Ry..
253. "Maryland has been trying criminal cases without a jury, on the election of the
accused for over three hundred years. In 1924 a Judiciary committee of the State of
Maryland actually reported a bill unfavorably because no man should be deprived of his
right to be tried without a jury trial. The doctrine that a man must be protected in his
right to be tried by the court without a jury may sound as though it were one of the
ravings of Alice's Mad Hatter in Wonderland. Yet in Maryland that right is a funda-
mental one, as carefully fostered and protected, if not by constitutional edict, at least by
deep rooted sentiment and whole-hearted reverence and support, as is the correlative right
to a jury trial, if demanded." California approved a device similar to Maryland's after
a study by its Judicial Council. CAL. CoNsT. art. 1, § 7. So did Connecticut and Michigan.
Cf. BOND, TuE MARYLAND PRACTcE 11, n. 2:
"The trials are usually less formal than trials before a jury and of course quicker.
There is no delay in the selection of the tribunal, often opening statements are omitted
as unnecessary, the evidence is more direct and concise, and there are fewer objections or
other interruptions. The judges as they go along ask questions to clear up matters for
themselves. They may, without inconvenience, interrupt a trial and hold it open for days
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York's Judicial Council is now considering a procedural device similar
to that of Maryland.'
What of New York and other crowded jurisdictions in civil cases?
There follows an adaptation of the suggested plan of attack to congested
tribunals in American urban centers.
III
The Victory
Whether the "New Procedure" will prove of value in the United
States remains to be seen. In order that we may really understand it,
let us visualize the course of an ordinary contract case or personal injury
action in the Supreme Court of New York County.
We first assume that a majority of the justices of the Appellate Di-
vision, First Department has certified to the Governor that a calendar
emergency exists and that the "New Procedure" will be deemed in
force in that department pending further order of the court.
1. (a) The Summons and Complaint are served, with a certificate of
plaintiff's attorney of record to the effect that the case is in progress
under the "New Procedure"-Defendant has seven days to answer-
(b) Answer containing a counterclaim is served-Plaintiff has
seven days to-
(c) Reply-(Issue is therefore completely joined twenty-one
days after the action began).
2. Note of Issue-must be served and filed seven days after issue is
first joined--case receives a calendar number and starts to work its way
up. A marked copy of the pleadings must be simultaneously filed with
the calendar clerk.
3. Assignment to a Justice for Supervision of Pre-Trial Manoeuvres-
Calendar clerk forwards the pleadings and a notation of the "New Pro-
cedure" issue to the justice presiding at Trial Term, Part 2, who
designates a justice of the court as "Supervisory Justice" for each par-
ticular case. (Probably no other justice will ever have to read the
pleadings in the case, as will be hereinafter indicated.) The justices
initially chosen for "Supervision" are those sitting in the trial parts of
Special Term and Trial Term. Ultimately, however, all the justices of
until other witnesses they might like to hear are hunted up. They may hold it under
advisement for days, after all the evidence is in, to reflect upon it. Sometimes the
examination of witnesses suggests the excellence of additional evidence which may go right to
the point of final difficulty in the judge's mind. Where the evidence may he on the side
of the accused the judge is especially careful to bring it into the ca--Arguments on the
facts are often omitted.' Maryland contends, moreover, that judges are le:: free from
public clamor, race prejudice, and "trial by newspapers." They are more susceptible to an
argument on the law. The judge's experience is frequently wider, more helpful, and so forth.
29. First Report, p. 11, (1935).
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the court will have "supervision" of an equal number of cases. Lists of the
justices and of the cases under their "supervision" are permanently kept
at Trial Term, Part 2, in order to provide "balance"-i.e. to keep an
equal number of cases in the hands of the respective justices of the court
for "supervision." Such lists would be kept somewhat as follows:
LIST 1
Actions Supervised Under New Procedure
Case Justice20
Abbott v. Doane Black
Ader v. Blau Cohn
Akely v. Kinnicutt Cotillo
Bernstein v. Kritzer Church
Brill v. Tuttle Dore
LIST 2
Justices Supervising New Procedure Actions
Justice
Black Cohn Cotillo
Abbott v. Doane Ader v. Blau Akely v. Kinnicutt
Eaton v. Reich Eames v. Prosser Epstein v. Gluckin
Exton v. Home Everson v. General Farmers v. Winthrop
Fonseca v. Cunard Farrow v. Wilson Fokine v. Shubert
Glanzer v. Shepherd Grundt v. Shenk Graf v. Hope
The case now becomes "Justice Blank's case" for all pre-trial purposes
and for trial if he feels that he has not been prejudiced by participa-
tion in the pre-trial proceedings. If he feels that he has become prej-
udiced, he remits the case to Trial Term, Part 2, for assignment for
trial in the normal way.
4. Directions from the "Supervisory Justice" as to Pre-Trial Manoeu-
vres-A. Thirty days after the case is made "Justice Blank's case for
29a. The names here used are taken, in alphabetical order, from the Trial Term assign-
ment list for May, 1935. It is probable that for "supervision" purposes the First Judicial
District would have to be treated as a unit, since the Justices therein sit in both Manhat-
tan and the Bronx from time to time. Mr. Justice Cohn's name is used in the text to get
the benefit of alphabetization in demonstrating that the Bronx justices are to be considered
in the parcelling out of cases for "supervision." It would probably be unfair to Mr. Justice
Cohn to assign him cases for supervision at the very outset, since he is simultaneously hold-
ing Special Term, Part 1 and Trial Term, Part 2 in May, 1935. The ultimate objectivo Is
to have all of the justices "supervising" an equal number of cases, leaving It to them to
regulate their personal "supervision" calendars. If the "Administrative Justice" recom-
mended by the Judicial Council duly functions, the problems of cooperation between the
counties and of equalization of judicial work will undoubtedly be speedily solved. In the
meantime, the Presiding Justice of the Appellate Division is of course available for consulta-
tion and suggestion.
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supervision," Justice Blank issues a call for counsel. All counsel in the
case appear before him at a given time. He has analyzed the pleadings
and now receives the following: a. Demands for Bills of Particulars;
b. Notices of Examination before Trial; c. Notices of Discovery and In-
spection; d. Notices to Admit; e. Motion papers on motions to amend
or dismiss; f. Summary judgment motion papers; g. Motion papers for
judgment on the pleadings; h. Papers for other motions. If the papers
are not complete at this conference all pre-trial manoeuvres are waived
(except motions for judgment on the pleadings, a motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction or to dismiss for insufficiency) unless Justice Blank
extends time for good cause shown, and on such terms as may be just.
If Justice Blank requires it, counsel must also furnish: i. A confidential
list of witnesses for the supervisory justice and a terse statement of what
the party expects to prove by such witnesses. j. A confidential offer of
settlement for the consideration of the justice at Trial Term, Part 2, to
be disclosed to the other side only on consent, so that conciliation and
settlement may be attempted without prejudicing the Supervisory Justice.
(The justice in Trial Term, Part 2, might be given the power to fix and
file in a sealed wrapper a settlement figure at which a party should settle
in his opinion after considering all the circumstances, such wrapper to be
opened after verdict. If it develops that the party proceeded to trial
without justification, then treble the damages if the defendant lacked
justification or reduce the verdict to one-third the amount of the recovery
if the plaintiff was unjustified. b If that is too severe, then tax very
substantial costs in such event, e.g. the amount of the winner's reason-
able attorney's fees.)
Justice Blank is deemed to be holding "Special Term Part A" for
purposes of supervision, to avoid constitutional complications. °
B. After due consideration, either simultaneously or from time to
time the Supervisory Justice passes on all of the following
"Fourteen Points"
1. Judgment on the Pleadings.
2. Summary or Partial Judgment.
3. Motions to strike out causes of action or defenses, to clarify or
amend pleadings and add or drop parties and other "prompt"
motions.
4. Bills of Particulars.
5. Discovery and Inspection; Depositions.
6. Examination before trial of parties or persons in the nature of
parties."
7. Preference.
29b. Cf. N. Y. FEAL LAW, § 1433; N. Y. PuB. Oiw. L., § 67.
30. See note 17, supra.
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8. Limitation of number of expert witnesses or provision for experts
to be employed by court on consent and at expense of both
parties equally.
9. Order that certain incidental questions of fact may be proved
by affidavit.s0a
10. Order the examination before trial of witnesses other than
parties if
a. The Supervisory Justice personally superintends such ex-
amination.81
b. The Supervisory Justice designates such witnesses from his
confidential list and states in what order they shall be
examined.3a
c. The Supervisory Justice enumerates the matters about which
such witnesses may be examined.
11. If he feels that the case is a "short case" or that the interests of
expediting justice require it, he dispenses with a jury and orders
the case tried before himself, or via the Justice at Trial Term,
Part 2. This of course requires a constitutional amendment and
the rule would obtain only during emergencies, the existence of
which are certified to the Governor by a majority of the Justices
of the Appellate Division in each particular department.
12. If he feels that although the case is technically a "New Pro-
cedure" case, it is not readily adaptable thereto, he orders it tried
on the regular calendar in its regular order or otherwise. In his
discretion he orders that all subsequent pre-trial manoeuvres be
referred to him.
13. He determines whether appeals may be taken from any or all
of his pre-trial orders. If he denies leave to appeal, application
30a. Cf. Civ. Prac. Act § 354, as amended to take effect Sept. 1, 1935, providing that
the testimony of hospital physicians and nurses in an ordinary negligence case is to be taken
before a referee, subject to the discretion of the court. This amendment would seem to be
an inroad on the constitutional right to a jury trial unless it is to be interpreted somewhat
as was Rule 108 of the Rules of Civil Practice in Herzog v. Brown, 217 App. Div. 402, 216
N. Y. Supp. 134, 136 (1926); and Perloff v. Kelmenson, 233 N. Y. Supp. 861 (App. Div.
1929). Is the testimony taken before the referee to be limited by section.304 of the Civil
Practice Act so that it cannot be read in evidence If the witness is available for subpoena?
31. Cf. Report of the Joint Committee of N. Y. City Bar Ass'ns dated March 15,
1934, "A witness with no financial or other interest in a case should not be torn from
his business or employment at the whim of opposing counsel. Such witnesses should not
be subjected to a preliminary cross-examination conducted in an obscure corner of some
unused court room or in the office of the attorney conducting the examination, nor
without supervision or control."
31a. Recall that section 288 of the Civil Practice Act already lends statutory sanction
to the examination of witnesses other than parties where "other special circumstances" ren-
der it proper that their depositions should be taken. This language is so broad that It
would seem an obvious invitation to the rule-making power to use its discretion If the ends
of justice require it.
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may be made to the Appellate Division for such leave. In no
event may an appeal be taken from a pre-trial order without
leave.
14. He determines whether for any reason the action should be taken
from the "New Procedure" list. The "New Procedure" is not
to be applicable to cases involving libel, slander, malicious prose-
cution, false imprisonment, or fraud-i.e. it is to be used princi-
pally in personal injury actions, contract actions and equity
actions.
Conclusion
The foregoing has been written with the dreamy eye of an academician
and the forlorn hope of an active lawyer that it may spell the death of
the law's delay in congested communities. The plan suggested un-
doubtedly has many inadvisable features and it is not expected that it
will be fully approved or that any part of it will be acclaimed as a
panacea. The central idea is worthy of thought, however, since it is
based on the wisdom of our federal courts, the Virginia legislature, and
the British Crown. The writer has brooded over it for two yearsP2 and
has advocated it orally before the New York Judicial Council, with
favorable reactions from many lawyers. Criticism and discussion are
healthy things and successful procedural devices have frequently evolved
from the creative activity of many minds. Something must be done to
bring to the interminable delay of civil litigation the simple and ordered
guidance of divine common sense. With the advent of Judicial Councils,
the storm and the deluge of calendar congestion have appreciably abated
and the thunder of litigants, bound hand and foot with procedural red
tape, has been somewhat stilled. Of course "There is still some heat
lightning, even today. Yet .... there is always the cer.tainty that true
fundamentals cannot be disturbed for long.... The very test of our law
is that it never lives wholly apart from ideas and manners. That is why
we have it, why we cannot do without it.... Changes can be expected and
should be hopefully received; but never an alien system, nor yet the
spirit that always denies.... Our history justifies the confidence that
while the bad cannot last, the good will remain."'
32. (1933) 2 BRoOxLx- LAW PRnIw 328, 330: "The English New Procedure of 1932
... wM be copied in New York within the next two years. '
33. Gi=, LIQUIDATION (1935) 878.
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